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THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN
IN LEGAL ETHICS
Katherine R. Kruse*

When legal ethics developed as an academic discipline in the mid-1970s, its
theoretical roots were in moral philosophy. The early theorists in legal ethics were
moral philosophers by training, and they explored legal ethics as a branch of
moral philosophy. From the vantage point of moral philosophy, lawyers’
professional duties comprised a system of moral duties that governed lawyers in
their professional lives, a ―role-morality‖ for lawyers that competed with ordinary
moral duties. In defining this ―role-morality,‖ the moral philosophers accepted the
premise that ―good lawyers‖ are professionally obligated to pursue the interests
of their clients all the way to the arguable limits of the law, even when doing so
would harm third persons or undermine the public good. More recent scholarship
in legal ethics has rejected the moral philosophers’ premise that lawyers’ ethical
duties demand instrumentalist partisan interpretation of the ―bounds of the law.‖
In what I call the ―jurisprudential turn‖ in legal ethics, legal scholars are now
increasingly looking to jurisprudential and political theory to explore the
interpretive stance that it is appropriate for lawyers to take with respect to the
―bounds of the law‖ that limit their partisan advocacy. Just as jurisprudential
theories of adjudication ground judges’ duties of legal interpretation in the role of
judges in a democratic society, jurisprudential theories of lawyering ground
lawyers’ interpretive duties in analysis of the role lawyers play in a democratic
system of government. This Article critically examines the emerging uses of
jurisprudential theory in legal ethics. It argues that jurisprudential theory presents
an attractive alternative to moral theory in legal ethics because it provides a
rubric for limiting lawyers’ no-holds-barred partisan manipulation of law that
springs directly from the lawyer’s professional duties rather than competing with
them. It critiques the two major schools of thought in the ―jurisprudence of
lawyering,‖ based on Dworkian and positivist jurisprudence. And it questions the
common framework within each jurisprudential school, which assigns lawyers a
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role as case-by-case lawmakers, suggesting that this framework imposes an
inappropriately lawyer-centered focus on assessments of the legitimacy of law that
more properly belong to clients.

INTRODUCTION
Clients come to lawyers to find out what the law requires, prohibits, or
allows them to do. However, the limits of the law are often unclear, and lawyers
must exercise professional judgment in choosing how to explain the law to their
clients. Legal ethicists have recently begun to debate the contours of lawyers‘
jurisprudential duties when counseling clients, grappling in the process with how
to apply jurisprudential theory about the relationship between law and morality to
the tasks of lawyering.1 This ―jurisprudential turn‖ in legal ethics is based on the
premise that in counseling and advising their clients, lawyers are not merely
transmitting information about law but are playing a quasi-official role in shaping
the ―bounds of the law‖ within which their clients operate. 2 Although each lawyer–
client consultation affects the life and affairs of only one client, legal ethicists
argue, the aggregate of these consultations determines the shape of law as it exists
in society.3 Lawyers thus play a lawmaking or law-interpreting role that is
different from, but no less important than, the role that legislatures and judges play
in creating and interpreting law.
Consider Stephen Pepper‘s example of a lawyer counseling a
manufacturing plant about the effect of environmental regulations that prohibit
discharge of ammonia into the ground water in amounts greater than 0.050 grams
per liter.4 Should the lawyer inform the client that violations of less than 0.075 per
liter will be ignored by the EPA? Or that first-time violations of less than 1.5

1.
Recent exploration of the jurisprudence of lawyering can be found in
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE (1998); TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF
ROGUES?: A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER‘S ROLE (2009); and
W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). See also DAVID LUBAN,
Natural Law as Professional Ethics: A Reading of Fuller, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN
DIGNITY 99 (2007) [hereinafter HUMAN DIGNITY] (reading Lon Fuller‘s jurisprudence about
lawmaking as inclusive of the work of legislators, judges, and lawyers).
2.
See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 1167 (2005). See also DAVID LUBAN, A Different Nightmare and a Different
Dream, in HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 131, 131 (describing lawyer–client
consultations as a ―the primary point of intersection between ‗The Law‘ and the people it
governs, the point at which the law in books becomes the law in action‖).
3.
LUBAN, supra note 2, at 145–52; Wendel, supra note 2, at 1172; David B.
Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 476–78 (1990).
4.
This example was presented by Pepper as a moral problem in his classic
defense of traditional partisan legal ethics. Stephen Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical
Role: A Defense, A Problem and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 627–
28 [hereinafter Pepper, Lawyer’s Amoral Role]. It was discussed again in the context of a
range of examples of counseling clients about enforcement or remedies in Stephen L.
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of
Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1550–52 (1995) [hereinafter Pepper, Counseling at the
Limits].
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grams per liter will result in only a warning?5 Whether the lawyer acknowledges it
or not, in choosing to include or exclude enforcement information, the lawyer has
taken a jurisprudential stand on whether such enforcement practices are written
into the ―bounds of the law‖ within which clients are entitled to operate. Lawyers‘
jurisprudential stands on these issues also affect law‘s reach in society. If lawyers
in an industry regularly advise clients about the limits of administrative
enforcement, the practical effect of the law in society will mirror the limits of its
enforcement rather than its intended scope.
Jurisprudential issues are also implicated when lawyers decide whether to
seek out or take advantage of ―loopholes‖ in the law, interpretations that comply
technically with the letter of the law but violate the law‘s spirit or purpose. Enron‘s
―creative and aggressive‖ approach to interpreting permissible accounting
practices under securities regulations contravened regulatory purposes and
eventually led to the company‘s financial collapse.6 The Bush administration‘s
legal justifications for the use of interrogation tactics such as beatings,
waterboarding, sexual humiliation, and sleep deprivation relied on interpretations
of language prohibiting torture that ignored its history and context and stretched its
conventional legal meaning.7 The lawyers in these cases ―made law‖ by providing
legal opinions that guided their clients‘ actions. Yet, unlike public and reviewable
judicial opinions, the lawyers‘ interpretations of law were communicated in the
privacy of the lawyer–client relationship without the accountability of public
oversight.
Legal ethicists have long recognized that the choices lawyers make in
characterizing the law to their clients have jurisprudential implications, 8 but have
only recently focused attention on theoretical analysis of lawyers‘ duties to
interpret the law correctly or appropriately. This Article maps the emerging
―jurisprudence of lawyering‖ and raises questions about its current direction. Part I
sets the stage for the jurisprudential turn in legal ethics by describing the
implicit—though ethically problematic—jurisprudence of practicing lawyers,
which legal ethicists recognize as being based on a legal realist conception of law
as prediction of official behavior. When applied to legal ethics, the legal realist
conception of law is problematic because it deprives law of the capacity to set
normative limits on legal representation and encourages lawyers to view the
―bounds of the law‖ that are supposed to constrain their partisan pursuit of their
clients‘ interests from the perspective of a Holmesian ―bad man.‖
Taking this implicit jurisprudence as a given, early legal ethicists argued
that lawyers have a professional duty to limit the pursuit of their clients‘ objectives
on moral grounds, and legal ethics debates came to center around how robust a

Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1551.
Wendel, supra note 2, at 1170–71.
W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 81 (2005).
8.
See generally Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4; William H.
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS.
L. REV. 29.
5.
6.
7.
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role lawyers‘ moral judgments ought to play in shaping legal representation. 9 Both
critics and defenders of the legal realist jurisprudence agreed that lawyers have a
professional duty to bring their moral influence to bear on clients, differing
primarily on questions of how strongly and in what circumstances moral
counseling is required. The professional duty of moral influence is problematic,
however, because it threatens overreaching by lawyers beyond their legal
expertise, beyond their role as client agents and fiduciaries, and in contravention of
rule-of-law values that client objectives should be limited by law rather than by the
moral judgment of their lawyers.
The new jurisprudential theories in legal ethics reject both a duty of moral
counseling and the assumption that the bounds of the law must be understood
according to the legal realist conception of law. Instead, they define lawyers‘
jurisprudential duties in interpreting the ―bounds of the law‖ to place real and
sometimes substantial limits on lawyers‘ partisan advocacy. Jurisprudential
theories of lawyering are an attractive alternative to moral lawyering theories
because they derive limits on partisan advocacy from the practice of legal
interpretation, which falls squarely within the scope of lawyers‘ expertise and
decisionmaking authority in the lawyer–client relationship. However,
jurisprudential theories of lawyering are successful only to the extent that they can
provide a plausible and legitimate account of legal interpretation that is appropriate
to the lawyer–client relationship and fitted to the role that lawyers play in the legal
system and in society.
Part II examines and evaluates two schools of thought within
jurisprudential legal ethics: (1) William Simon‘s theory that lawyers should
interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ according to underlying principles of justice in
the style of a Dworkian judge, which joins the practice of lawyers advising clients
about the law with the larger project of making law coherent and substantively
just; and (2) positivist theories advanced by Bradley Wendel and Tim Dare, who
argue that in interpreting the ―bounds of the law,‖ lawyers should respect the
authority of law as society‘s resolution of contested moral and political
disagreement and not seek to unsettle that resolution by stretching legal
interpretation to meet either their clients‘ interests or their own conceptions of
morality or justice. Part II concludes that neither school of jurisprudential theory
achieves complete success as a jurisprudence of lawyering because even the
moderate indeterminacy that each theory leaves behind creates too much space for
lawyers to exercise judgment that is both pre-emptive of client decisionmaking and
unreviewable by the public.
Part III questions the common framing of the issues within the unfolding
jurisprudence of lawyering as questions about how lawyers should interpret the
―bounds of the law,‖ suggesting that this framework imposes an inappropriately
lawyer-centered focus on assessments of the legitimacy of law. It proposes instead
that lawyers have a jurisprudential duty to situate their clients to make
appropriately informed decisions about how strictly to comply with the law or how
best to order their affairs within legal frameworks based on the clients‘
assessments of the law‘s legitimacy.
9.

See infra Part I.B.
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The work of Ted Schneyer both inspires and guides this Article‘s analysis
of lawyers‘ jurisprudential duties. The jurisprudential project is one that Schneyer
has specifically advocated, calling on legal ethicists to ―help lawyers internalize a
jurisprudence‖ that takes a middle ground between moral activism and hired-gun
instrumentalism.10 For those embarking on the jurisprudential project, Schneyer‘s
work exemplifies two principles for making legal ethics theory responsive to
practice and useful to practitioners. First, he has insisted that in theorizing about
the role of lawyers, legal ethicists take into account the actual work that lawyers
do. His groundbreaking article, ―Moral Philosophy‘s Standard Misconception of
Legal Ethics,‖ drew heavily on sociological studies of how lawyers actually
behave to challenge the assumptions about lawyer behavior on which the new legal
ethics models were based.11 His studies and analysis of the creation of the ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 12 of lawyer discipline,13 the role of in-house
counsel,14 and the regulation of lawyers in law firms15 and in dispute resolution
processes16 are characterized by the same balanced, complex, and empirically
grounded perspective on the challenges and motivations of practicing lawyers.
Second, Schneyer‘s work reminds us that if theoretical legal ethics is to
have meaning and value for lawyers, it must resonate with the basic values of the
legal profession. He has repeatedly noted that a significant purpose of professional
regulation is to protect clients and the public against lawyer self-interest, warning
against the perils of using public values as a guidepost for legal ethics,17 and
applauding the emergence of theories that preserve and elaborate the basic client10.
Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11, 26
(1991). In this regard, Ted has noted that ―[w]ith an appropriately purposive jurisprudence,
full-bore partisanship—doing everything one can for clients up to the limits of the law—
becomes less worrisome because the law as interpreted corresponds more closely with
moral values or at least policy purposes.‖ Id.
11.
Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy’s Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics,
1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529.
12.
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677 (1989).
13.
Ted Finman & Ted Schneyer, The Role of Bar Association Ethics Opinions
in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67 (1981).
14.
Ted Schneyer, Professionalism and Public Policy: The Case of House
Counsel, 2 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 449 (1988).
15.
Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1991) [hereinafter Schneyer, Discipline for Firms]; Ted Schneyer, A Tale of Four
Systems: Reflections on How Law Regulates the ―Ethical Infrastructure‖ of Law Firms, 39
S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998) [hereinafter Schneyer, Ethical Infrastructure]; Geoffrey C.
Hazard & Ted Schneyer, Regulatory Controls on Large Law Firms: A Comparative
Perspective, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 593 (2002).
16.
Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A
Study in Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2008).
17.
Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils
of Privileging ―Public‖ over Professional Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831 (2002)
[hereinafter Schneyer, Perils of Public Values]; see also Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define
Arizona’s Corporate Attorney–Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through
the Power to Regulate the Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419 (2006).
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centered values of the legal profession.18 These aspects of Schneyer‘s work have
influenced the development of my own work in legal ethics and infuse the analysis
I provide in this Article, paying tribute in a small way to the much larger influence
of Schneyer‘s grounded realism and critical eye in legal ethics.

I. LAW AND MORALITY IN LEGAL ETHICS
The jurisprudential turn in legal ethics is a shift in theoretical focus from
analyzing the moral dilemmas that lawyers face because of their professional role
to questions of how lawyers should interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ that constrain
their partisan representation of clients. This Part maps the emergence of
jurisprudential theory in legal ethics by examining how ethically problematic legal
realist conceptions of law set the stage for the jurisprudential turn in legal ethics,
how the early legal ethicists proposed that lawyers make up for the ethical
deficiencies of this implicit jurisprudence of lawyering by incorporating personal
moral judgment into legal representation, and how the ―jurisprudential turn‖
avoids the problems with this moral alternative.
A. Legal Realism as the Operating Jurisprudence of Practicing Lawyers
Legal ethicists have identified legal realist conceptions of law as a core
component of the implicit operating jurisprudence of everyday lawyers. 19 Legal
Realism identified a gap between the ―law in books‖ and the ―law in action,‖
which Roscoe Pound described as ―a very real and a very deep‖ distinction
between ―the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man and those
that in fact govern them.‖20 Legal Realists insisted that accurate description of the
―real rules‖ that govern society cannot be captured by parsing the words of statutes
or the written opinions of appellate judges, but must include study of the way that
―paper rules‖ are interpreted, implemented, applied, or ignored as they are carried
into practice.21 As Karl Llewellyn ruminated, the business of law is dispute
resolution and ―whether they be judges or sheriffs or clerks or jailers or lawyers
. . . . What these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.‖22
Although the legal realist ―prediction theory‖ has well-demonstrated
shortcomings as a definition of law, it is a functional point of view for lawyers to

18.
Ted Schneyer, The Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the
Lawyer‘s Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 45, 70–78 (2004).
19.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–25; DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 18–20 (1988); see also Brian Leiter, Rethinking
Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (1997)
(―[T]he Core Claim of Realism is that judges reach decisions based on what they think
would be fair on the facts of the case, rather than on the basis of the applicable rules of
law.‖).
20.
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15
(1910).
21.
Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Steps, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 447–57 (1930).
22.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE
LAW AND LAW SCHOOL 5 (1930).

2011]

JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN

499

take in advising clients.23 The law that matters most to clients is the law that will
affect their lives directly; and lower-court judges and other legal officials often
provide the final statement of the law in a client‘s case. 24 Indeed, lawyers who did
not take account of gaps between what the ―law in books‖ says and how the law is
likely to be applied or implemented in a client‘s case might be criticized for
providing legal advice that, while technically accurate, was nonetheless useless to
their clients as a practical matter.
However, the legal realist conception of law is also ethically problematic.
When translated from the predictions of lower-level officials in clients‘ cases to a
more general conception of law, the radical indeterminacy inherent in the legal
realist conception of law poses one set of problems. 25 If law is nothing other than
what legal officials do in implementing the law, no official interpretation of law
can be said to be better than any other.26 To illustrate this point, Brad Wendel asks
us to consider the interpretive challenge posed by a lawyer representing a mining
company required by federal law to pay disability benefits to employees who are
―totally disabled‖ due to Black Lung Disease. 27 Suppose a former employee has
been receiving benefits from the company based on the presence of a lesion on his
lung measuring 1.5 cm, a condition entitling him to a statutory presumption that he
is ―totally disabled.‖28 After the benefits have paid for a lung transplant, a creative
reading of the statute might arguably permit the company to terminate disability
payments for the expensive medication and treatment necessary to keep his body
from rejecting the new lung. Because the new lung no longer has a lesion, the
argument might go, the employee is no longer presumptively ―totally disabled,‖
and must go through a time consuming administrative process to prove his
disability.29 Wendel argues that nothing in the implicit operating jurisprudence of
traditional lawyering constrains this interpretation; as long as there is a
nonfrivolous argument supporting the interpretation, the lawyer would be entitled
(and maybe even required) to deploy it on behalf of the client. 30

23.
The ―prediction theory of law‖ has been reduced to absurdity when applied
to appellate judges, who cannot coherently be said to be predicting their own behavior when
they decide cases. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 141–47 (2d ed. 1994); see also
LUBAN, supra note 19, at 22–23. However, from the perspective of lawyers advising clients,
prediction is coherent. See Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L.
REV. 651, 656–60 (1995).
24.
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 50–51 (1930); Llewellyn,
supra note 21, at 455–56.
25.
Wilkins, supra note 3, at 474–75.
26.
Id. at 484. If the legal realist conception of law as prediction of official
behavior is spun even more radically, no way of influencing legal officials can be said to be
better than any other; the legitimacy of bribery and threats cannot be distinguished from the
legitimacy of a persuasive legal argument. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 20–21.
27.
W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 389–93
(2004).
28.
Id. at 389–91.
29.
Id. at 391–92.
30.
Id. at 391.

500

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:493

The legal realist conception of law is also ethically problematic because
the ―external point of view‖ it takes on law strips law of its normative content. 31
Holmes famously wrote that ―[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you
must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which
such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons
for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.‖32 The Holmesian ―bad man‖ view of the law undermines respect for
law as a source of normative guidance and replaces it with a view of law as
―something like a force of nature, which can be studied and hopefully avoided, but
which does not alter the citizen‘s practical reasoning.‖33 Because the Holmesian
―bad man‖ perspective encourages citizens to continually unsettle the boundaries
set by law as they seek to avoid its enforcement, it also limits law‘s effectiveness
and increases its cost as a mechanism to coordinate and structure the common life
of society.34
Of particular concern among legal ethicists is the prospect that by
advising clients about the law from a legal realist perspective, lawyers encourage
otherwise law-abiding or law-respecting citizens to view the law more
instrumentally than they otherwise would.35 A client might enter a lawyer‘s office
as a Holmesian good man who views the law as a source of normative guidance on
a human problem (or, as Hart might say, as ―the ‗puzzled man‘ or ‗ignorant man‘
who is willing to do what is required, if only he can be told what it is‖). 36 In the
lawyer‘s translation of the client‘s situation from a human problem into a legal
problem, the lawyer will tend to define the client‘s objectives as coextensive with
the client‘s legal interests, which most often revolve around maximizing the
client‘s wealth, freedom, or power over others.37 In the process, the lawyer will
―distill out, or disguise, the moral dimension and the more complex human
elements from the situation.‖38 In advising clients that they ―should do‖ what it is
in their legal interests to do, lawyers may implicitly encourage clients to press their
legal interests further than the clients might otherwise be inclined to go.39 As
Stephen Pepper has pointed out, the unfortunate result is that both the lawyer and
the client can evade moral responsibility for decisions that harm others, with the
lawyer perceiving moral decisions to be outside the realm of legal advice, and the
31.
See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Lawyers, Citizens and the Internal Point
of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473 (2006).
32.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897).
33.
Wendel, supra note 31, at 1473.
34.
Id. at 1473–76; Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1553.
35.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 625–26; see also Katherine
R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 133
(2010).
36.
HART, supra note 23, at 40.
37.
See generally Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client’s Interests, 77 MICH.
L. REV. 1078 (1979); Simon, supra note 8, at 52–59; Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as
Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 1, 21 (1975).
38.
Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers’ Ethics in the Gap Between Law and Justice, 40
S. TEX. L. REV. 181, 188 (1999).
39.
Kruse, supra note 35, at 133; Lehman, supra note 37, at 1088–90.
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client perceiving the lawyer‘s advice as authority or permission to do only what
the law requires and no more.40
Taking the ethically problematic legal realist jurisprudence of the
―bounds of the law‖ as a set feature of legal representation, early legal ethicists
turned to moral theory, arguing that lawyers have a duty to reign in their partisan
zeal by supplementing the ―bounds of the law‖ with additional constraints based
on the personal moral judgments that lawyers would make outside their
professional roles.41 The next section demonstrates how both critics and defenders
of legal realism as a jurisprudence of practicing lawyers turned to this moral
solution, differing primarily on the question of how robust a role lawyers‘ moral
judgments should play in legal representation.
B. The Professional Duty to Exercise Moral Judgment
When legal ethics developed as an academic discipline in the mid-1970s,
its theoretical roots were in moral philosophy. 42 Many of the early theorists in legal
ethics were moral philosophers by training, and they explored legal ethics as a
branch of moral philosophy.43 From the moral philosophical point of view,
lawyers‘ professional duties were a ―role morality‖ defining what it meant to be a
―good lawyer,‖ and the most interesting questions in legal ethics were not the
nature of lawyers‘ ethical lapses, but whether ―the professional ideal is itself
morally worthy.‖44 The central question that captured the attention of these moral
philosophers was put succinctly by Charles Fried as the opening sentence of a
seminal article in the field: ―Can a good lawyer be a good person?‖ 45
Moral philosophers understood lawyers‘ role morality by reference to
principles of partisanship and neutrality in what they called the ―standard
conception‖ of the lawyer‘s role.46 As the moral philosophers saw it, the standard
40.
Pepper, supra note 38, at 188–92.
41.
Kruse, supra note 35, at 122–29.
42.
Although theoretical legal ethics solidified as an academic field in legal
scholarship in the 1970s, conceptions of the ethics and role of lawyers in society have long
reflected and been grounded in jurisprudential theories and political philosophy. See
generally Russell G. Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public
Philosophy, Jurisprudence and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339 (2006). The
earliest American legal ethicists grounded their conception of lawyers as a governing class
in natural law jurisprudence and republican political theory. Id. at 1346–50.
43.
See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV.
873, 878–81 (1999) [hereinafter Luban, Reason and Passion] (describing this history);
David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal
Ethics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981) (laying out a research agenda of legal ethics
questions amendable to study and guidance by moral philosophy).
44.
DAVID LUBAN, THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYER‘S ROLES AND LAWYERS‘ ETHICS
1 (David Luban ed., 1984).
45.
See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of
the Lawyer–Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1060 (1976) (asking whether it is possible
for ―a good lawyer [to] be a good person‖). I have explored and critiqued this history in
more depth in Kruse, supra note 35, at 107–22.
46.
Authors have called the principles by various names and defined the
principles differently. LUBAN, supra note 19, at 7. As defined in the early legal ethical
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conception ―committed [lawyers] to the aggressive and single-minded pursuit of
the client‘s objectives‖ not only within the law, but ―all the way up to[] the limits
of the law.‖47 They saw lawyers‘ deployment of the legal realist conception of the
―bounds of the law‖ as a thinly justified lack of respect for law in the name of
partisan zeal, which impelled lawyers past the ordinary meaning and intended
purpose of legal limits to embrace any colorable interpretation of law that suited
their clients‘ interests—a style of interpretation David Luban called ―zeal at the
margin.‖48 However, they did not develop any alternative jurisprudence of
lawyering to replace legal realist conceptions of the ―bounds of the law.‖
To make up for the deficiencies created by the legal realist conception of
the bounds of the law, moral theorists conceived a robust role for lawyers‘
morality in legal representation. At its most extreme, ―moral activist‖ lawyering
tolerated only ―the most minor deviations from common morality‖ by lawyers in
most civil cases.49 Moral theorists argued that lawyers should have the prerogative
to withhold legal services to persons whose projects they found morally
objectionable.50 Additionally, they urged strategies of moral-activist client
counseling, in which lawyers ―take it upon themselves to judge and shape client
projects‖51 and actively ―steer [their] clients in the direction of the public good‖ 52
by employing strategies of persuasion, coercion, or even betrayal, to align the
client‘s decision with the lawyer‘s moral judgment. 53
writings, the principle of partisanship required lawyers to maximize their clients‘ objectives
―within, but all the way up to[] the limits of the law.‖ Gerald J. Postema, Moral
Responsibility in Legal Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 73 (1980) (emphasis omitted); Murray
L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669,
673 (1978). The principle of neutrality relieved lawyers of moral responsibility for the
harmful effects on others of actions taken in pursuit of their clients‘ objectives. See
Postema, supra, at 73; Schwartz, supra, at 673.
47.
Postema, supra note 46, at 73.
48.
DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in HUMAN DIGNITY, supra
note 1, at 19, 26.
49.
LUBAN, supra note 19, at 149. This conclusion is embedded within Luban‘s
larger argument that lawyers should take into account the moral justifications for their
adversarial role and weigh the strength of those justifications against the moral harm that
adhering to the role would cause. Id. at 128–47. According to Luban, where a lawyer
represents an individual squaring off against the state or a powerful institution, the moral
justifications for zealous partisan advocacy are strong. Id. at 148. It is in representing clients
with power greater than, or roughly equal to, their opponents that the adversary system is
only weakly justified. Id. at 92. In such cases, Luban argued, lawyers would be morally
enjoined from pursuing legally permissible but ―substantively unjust results.‖ Id. at 157.
50.
David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637, 642.
51.
David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41
VAND. L. REV. 717, 738 (1988).
52.
Id. at 721; LUBAN, supra note 19, at 171.
53.
See Luban, supra note 51, at 721. It should be noted, however, that this is an
extreme. David Luban, the original proponent of ―moral activist‖ client counseling has
described the heart of moral activist counseling as ―discussing with the client the rightness
and wrongness of her projects, and the possible impact of those projects [on ‗the people‘] in
the same matter-of-fact and (one hopes) unmoralistic manner that one discusses the
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The legal realist conception of the ―bounds of the law‖ was not without
defenders, the most prominent of whom was Stephen Pepper. Pepper raised early
objections to the moral theorists‘ project and argued that the legal realist
conception of law was a morally justified jurisprudence for lawyers. 54 Pepper‘s
defense was based on the premise that the core function of lawyers is to provide
―access to the law‖ as a public good. The primary function of providing ―access to
law‖ creates, at the very least, a rebuttable presumption that clients are entitled to
full information about the law, including information about available loopholes
and the limits of law enforcement.55 In cases where ―the law is manipulable and
without clear limits on client conduct,‖ Pepper argued, ―that aspect of the law
should be accessible to the client.‖ 56 To limit access to the law based on lawyers‘
personal views of right and wrong would threaten the status of law as a public
good and undermine the underlying values of autonomy, equality and diversity. 57
Yet, as Pepper recognized, the indeterminacy and lack of normative
content in the legal realist conception of law creates inevitable gaps between what
the client has a legal right to do and what it is morally right for the client to do. 58
Pepper and other defenders of the legal realist conception of law sought to close
the gap between law and morality by emphasizing that lawyers have secondary
obligations to exercise moral judgment in selecting clients, to engage their clients
in moral dialogue, or both. 59 However, Pepper delineated only limited
circumstances in which it would be appropriate for lawyers to refuse
representation or engage in moral dialogue with clients, noting the interference of
such actions with the primary duty of providing access to the law. 60
In the end, those who defended the legal realist conception of law as a
legitimate operating jurisprudence for everyday lawyers and those who bemoaned
it as an unfortunate reality of legal practice ended up debating the proper boundary
between law and morality in legal representation within the same theoretical
structure. Each camp understood the ―bounds of the law‖ to incorporate the legal
realists‘ conception of law as open-textured, manipulable, and devoid of normative
content. Because such limits are ultimately incapable of preventing moral harm,
each camp agreed that lawyers have a professional duty to supplement legal advice
with personal moral judgment in the form of moral dialogue with clients, a duty to
refuse representation on moral grounds, or both. They differed primarily on
financial aspects of a representation.‖ David Luban, Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy
in the Lawyer–Client Relationship, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1004, 1026 (1990) (quoting LUBAN,
supra note 19, at 173).
54.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–28.
55.
Pepper, Counseling at the Limits, supra note 4, at 1598–1600.
56.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 626.
57.
Stephen L. Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 657, 662–67.
58.
Pepper, supra note 38, at 186.
59.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 630–35; see also Monroe H.
Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 191, 199–
204 (1978).
60.
Pepper, supra note 38, at 192–96; Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note
4, at 632–33.
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questions of how strongly and in what circumstances it was appropriate for
lawyers to bridge the gaps between law and justice by bringing their moral
influence to bear in legal representation of their clients. 61
C. The Problems with Deploying Personal Moral Judgment in the Line of
Professional Duty
The reliance on lawyers‘ moral judgments to supplement and limit the
professional duty of partisan advocacy creates significant tensions with lawyers‘
role in the legal system. The permission given to lawyers to pursue client
objectives all the way to the ―bounds of the law‖ is grounded in rule-of-law values
that individuals should be free to pursue their projects and objectives within limits
set through open, public, and democratic processes. 62 When lawyers supplement
these legal boundaries and curtail or withhold legal representation based on their
private and personal judgments about whether clients‘ projects or objectives are
morally worthy, society runs the risk of substituting the rule of law with the rule of
an ―oligarchy of lawyers.‖63 The tension becomes especially acute in the context of
a morally pluralistic society, where the promotion of a robust role for morality in
the lawyer–client relationship can become a license for lawyers to impose their
personal resolution of contested moral issues on their clients‘ life choices. 64
Although lawyers are not ethically prevented from providing moral
advice to their clients,65 attempts to fashion a professional duty to incorporate
moral judgment into legal representation strain against the nature and purpose of
the lawyer–client relationship. The lawyer–client relationship is a fiduciary
relationship, in which the lawyer acts for the benefit of the client, bringing legal
knowledge and expertise to bear on matters of great importance to the client. 66 As
Tim Dare has argued, because of the imbalance of legal knowledge and expertise,
clients have only limited ability to assess their lawyers‘ competence and diligence
and very little information from which to ascertain the lawyer‘s personal, moral, or
political views.67 Although some ethicists have argued that the ideal lawyer–client
relationship should be like a friendship, in which lawyers and clients mutually
strive for goodness as they collaborate in addressing the moral issues that
inevitably arise in legal representation, 68 clients typically don‘t have the personal
information about their lawyers that we rely on when we turn to friends for moral
61.
See, e.g., Luban, supra note 50, at 649 (characterizing his difference with
Pepper as one of degree rather than kind). This observation is less accurate with respect to
Freedman, who grounds the importance of moral dialogue in respect for the client‘s dignity.
Freedman, supra note 59, at 203–04.
62.
Wilkins, supra note 3, at 472–73.
63.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 617.
64.
DARE, supra note 1, at 74–75; Wendel, supra note 27, at 376–83.
65.
The Model Rules contemplate that moral considerations may be part of the
lawyer‘s duty to ―exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.‖
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009).
66.
DARE, supra note 1, at 89–94.
67.
Id. at 89–93.
68.
THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 46–53 (2d ed. 2009).
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guidance, such as whether they share our values or have the life experience to
understand our dilemmas or empathize with our struggles. 69 When a lawyer takes
on the goal of morally educating the client or making the client a better person
through moral conversation, the problems of lack of moral expertise, risk of moral
overreaching, and threat to rule-of-law values arise.
The moral theorists‘ premise that the public would benefit from the moral
guidance that lawyers have to offer is also debatable. Moral judgment falls outside
the scope of specifically legal expertise. Although some scholars have argued that
lawyers‘ training and experience endows them with superior capacity to exercise
sound moral judgment,70 just as many have argued that lawyers‘ habitation of their
professional role impairs their moral capacities. 71 Moreover, the incorporation of
moral judgment into legal representation has the paradoxical quality of being least
effective in shaping moral outcomes in the situations in which it is acknowledged
to be most appropriate. Legal ethicists across the spectrum agree that the lawyer‘s
moral management of legal representation is least appropriate for clients who are
vulnerable to moral overreaching by their lawyers due to their relative lack of
power, sophistication, and capacity to seek a second opinion from another
lawyer.72 Yet they acknowledge that more sophisticated and powerful clients are
less likely to tolerate a lawyer‘s moral maneuvering, either by brushing off moral
advice as irrelevant or by seeking legal representation from a lawyer who will
provide representation free of moral challenge. 73
The jurisprudential turn in legal ethics presents an attractive alternative to
the moral theoretical solution to over-zealous partisanship because it provides
limits on lawyers‘ no-holds-barred partisanship that spring directly from lawyers‘
professional duties rather than from appeals to personal morality that compete with
professional duty. The turn to jurisprudential theory promises to remain consonant
with rule-of-law values by limiting lawyers‘ partisan pursuit of client interests
based on correct or legitimate interpretation of the law. Because the interpretation
of law is a quintessential lawyering task, it falls squarely within the scope of
lawyers‘ expertise and authority within the lawyer–client relationship. A lawyer
who interprets the law to set limits on client objectives thus avoids the dangers of
moral overreaching with vulnerable clients and gains traction with more powerful
clients.

II. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL TURN IN LEGAL ETHICS
In the recent jurisprudential turn in legal ethics, theorists draw on
jurisprudential theories to ground lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of the
law‖ in the role that lawyers play in the legal system and the role that law plays in

69.
DARE, supra note 1, at 95.
70.
See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 109–62 (1993).
71.
Wasserstrom, supra note 37, at 15; Postema, supra note 46, at 75–80.
72.
Pepper, supra note 38, at 194–95; SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 68, at
54–57.
73.
Pepper, supra note 38, at 193–94.
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society.74 This Part describes and evaluates the relative successes and
shortcomings of two alternative jurisprudential theories of correct or appropriate
interpretation that have been advanced within legal ethics: (1) William Simon‘s
theory that lawyers should interpret the ―bounds of the law‖ according to
underlying principles of justice in the style of a Dworkian judge; and (2) positivist
theories advanced by Bradley Wendel and Tim Dare, which argue that in
interpreting the ―bounds of the law‖ lawyers should respect the authority of law as
society‘s resolution of contested moral and political disagreement and not seek to
unsettle that resolution by stretching legal interpretation to meet either their
clients‘ interests or their own conceptions of morality or justice.
Jurisprudential questions of what makes legal interpretation legitimate
have more commonly been explored in the context of adjudication, and invoke
separation-of-powers issues regarding the role of judges in a democratic system of
law. The jurisprudence of lawyering re-frames the questions of correct or
appropriate interpretation within the context of the lawyer–client relationship.75
The stakes are arguably higher in the context of legal representation than they are
in adjudication because lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ are
carried out in the private and unreviewable context of the lawyer–client
relationship.76 To the extent that lawyers‘ interpretations of law deviate too
radically from law‘s ordinary meaning and intended purpose, lawyers privately
undermine publicly and democratically established frameworks for establishing
societal norms through law. Moreover, the consequences of incorrect or
illegitimate interpretation fall directly on clients, who often lack the necessary
expertise to challenge their lawyers‘ legal interpretations. As David Luban has
written (borrowing a metaphor from Hart), ―the Nightmare vision of legal advice‖
consists in the twin dangers that lawyers will ―dominate and manipulate clients,
either to advance their own agenda or to line their own pockets,‖ or lawyers will
―treat the advisor‘s role like that of an advocate and spin the law to support
whatever the client wishes to do.‖77 The ―Noble Dream in a jurisprudence centered
on the lawyer-advisor‖ is based on a vision of lawyers acting as intermediaries
between the law and those it governs. 78
The jurisprudence of lawyering aspires to fill out the details of the Noble
Dream of lawyers acting as intermediaries between the law and those it governs by
describing and justifying the appropriate interpretive practices for lawyers in
setting the ―bounds of the law‖ within which their clients are entitled to operate.
To succeed as a jurisprudence of lawyering, a theory must deliver on promises that
74.
Wendel, supra note 2, at 1176–77.
75.
See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Who Should Define Arizona’s Corporate Attorney–
Client Privilege?: Asserting Judicial Independence Through the Power to Regulate the
Practice of Law, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 419, 445 (2006).
76.
The institutional constraints on common law judging, such as the
requirements that judges reduce their opinions to writing, sit on panels, and hear the benefit
of adversary argument have been acknowledged by even Legal Realist Karl Llewellyn to
bring a sense of ―reckonability‖ to the law. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 19–51 (1960).
77.
LUBAN, supra note 2, at 158–59.
78.
Id. at 159–60.
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the ―bounds of the law‖ makes to clients and to the public. As David Wilkins has
written, legal ethics imposes complementary professional duties on lawyers to
further the private interests of particular individuals on the one hand, and to respect
and preserve ―the fair and efficient administration of justice‖ on the other. 79 The
directive to ―represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law‖ strikes a
balance between these private and public interests. 80 It promises clients that the
pursuit of their ends will be limited only by objective and identifiable external
constraints rather than by their lawyers‘ personal or idiosyncratic moral or political
views,81 and it promises the public that ―the pursuit of private ends will not unduly
frustrate public purposes.‖ 82 Moreover, the ―bounds of the law‖ are an ostensibly
legitimate constraint on the pursuit of private ends because law‘s authority derives
from the will of the people, who control its boundary through democratic
processes.83
To deliver on the promise to clients—that their projects will be limited by
objectively identifiable boundaries set by legitimate democratic processes rather
than by the personal or idiosyncratic views of their lawyers—a jurisprudence of
lawyering must constrain lawyers from displacing the public resolution of policy
issues with their personal views. To deliver on the promise to the public—that the
partisan pursuit of private ends will not unduly frustrate the public interest—a
jurisprudence of lawyering must constrain lawyers from manipulating the meaning
of law in ways that skew the bounds of the law toward their clients‘ private ends.
The legal realist implicit jurisprudence of everyday lawyering, which
―stresses [law‘s] open-textured, vague nature over its precision; its manipulability
over its certainty; and its instrumental possibilities over its normative content,‖ 84
arguably fails to deliver on these promises to either clients or the public for two
reasons.85 First, the agnosticism about correct or legitimate interpretation in the
legal realist conception of law conflicts with the rule-of-law notion that disputes
among members of a society ought to be resolved by reference to impartially
applied rules and principles, rather than lawyers‘ idiosyncratic or personal
beliefs.86 It unravels the traditional legal ethical model‘s promise to the public by
opening the door for lawyers‘ instrumentalist manipulation of the ―bounds of the
law‖ that are supposed to constrain their partisanship, 87 effectively collapsing
lawyers‘ public duties into the pursuit of their clients‘ private interests. 88 Second, it
79.
Wilkins, supra note 3, at 470–71.
80.
Id. at 473–74.
81.
Id. at 472.
82.
Id. at 471.
83.
Id. at 473.
84.
Pepper, Lawyers’ Amoral Role, supra note 4, at 624–26.
85.
Wilkins, supra note 3, at 484.
86.
Dorf, supra note 23, at 680–89. Some legal realists argued that judges decide
cases primarily based on personal or idiosyncratic hunches and then search for legal
justification in conceptual rules. See FRANK, supra note 24, at 111–12; Joseph C. Hutcheson,
Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the ―Hunch‖ in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL
L. REV. 274 (1928).
87.
See Postema, supra note 46, at 73; see also LUBAN, supra note 19, at 18–19.
88.
Wilkins, supra note 3, at 483–84.
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threatens clients‘ interests by positioning lawyers to deploy interpretations of the
law that secure their own financial or reputational interests at the expense of their
clients.89
To the extent that proposed alternative jurisprudential theories deliver
determinate answers to questions of legal interpretation, they can fulfill the
promises of legal ethics to clients and to the public. The central question for a
jurisprudence of lawyering is how well it guides lawyers faced with a range of
plausible interpretations to resolve the open questions of interpretation that remain.
As Brad Wendel has written, theories of legal ethics are ―‗normative all the way
down,‘ with a theory of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law,
which in turn justifies a conception of the lawyer‘s role.‖ 90 It is by reference to this
normative substructure that lawyers can escape the problems raised by the moral
theories in legal ethics and make judgments grounded in professional values
incident to their role in the legal system. 91 The success of a jurisprudence of
lawyering rides on whether it provides criteria for choosing among plausible
interpretations that appropriately balance the public and private interests at stake
when lawyers advise clients about the law.
A. Substantive Justice and Dworkian Interpretation
William Simon was the first legal ethicist to break from the fold of moral
theory and explicitly ground legal ethics in jurisprudential theory. 92 Simon
proposed replacing the various categorical and client-centered norms in legal
ethics—zeal, confidentiality, loyalty—with a single imperative that lawyers
exercise discretionary and contextualized judgment to ―take such actions as,
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to
promote justice,‖ or as he synonymously called it, ―legal merit.‖ 93 In deciding
questions of justice, Simon proposed that lawyers invoke the same style of
contextual reasoning that judges employ in deciding questions of law, taking into
account the background values, principles and purposes that underlie the letter of

89.
Some analysts suggest that in advising clients, lawyers do just that. See, e.g.,
AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER
AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 106–07 (1995) (documenting conversations between
divorce lawyers and clients); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence
Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC‘Y REV. 15, 18–31 (1967)
(analyzing the institutional factors that cause defense lawyers to manipulate their clients
into accepting plea bargains); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the
Results: The Role of Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 375,
423–26 (1997) (providing a model explaining why lawyers would overestimate legal risk to
their clients).
90.
Wendel, supra note 2, at 1176–77.
91.
See generally W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1999).
92.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 13 (―An important premise of my argument is that
the key issues of legal ethics are jurisprudential, that is, they implicate questions of the
nature and purpose of law and the legal system.‖); see also Luban, Reason and Passion,
supra note 43, at 877–85.
93.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 9, 138.
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the law and provide it with legitimate authority. 94 In Simon‘s view, a lawyer‘s
determinations of what actions seem likely to promote justice are not simply
expressions of lawyers‘ personal or moral beliefs; rather, they are ―legal judgments
grounded in the methods and sources of authority of the professional culture.‖ 95
Simon‘s equation of ―justice‖ and ―legal merit‖ and the style of legal
reasoning he prescribed for determining the ―bounds of the law‖ borrow heavily
from the jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin. 96 Like Dworkin, Simon argued that
background values, principles and purposes ―are part of the law in the sense that
they affect the decisions of cases.‖97 More importantly, Simon argued, law‘s
consistency with these background values provides the strongest reason to respect
and obey the law.98 Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering invites lawyers to join
Dworkin‘s project of making law the best it can be by interpreting the ―bounds of
the law‖ according to principles of justice that both fit with past interpretations of
law and justify its continued legitimacy. 99
Simon argued that the ―dominant view‖ of legal ethics defines law too
narrowly in positivist terms that privilege its form over its substance. 100 Such a
narrow interpretation is problematic in Simon‘s view because it mandates that
lawyers adhere to technical legal limits even when the law is unfair or has become
outmoded.101 At the same time, it encourages lawyers to structure client affairs in
ways that technically comply with the letter of the law even though they
undermine law‘s purposes.102 Simon argued that lawyers should resist these
temptations of technical adherence to positive law and interpret the ―bounds of the

94.
Id. at 139, 144–45.
95.
Id. at 138.
96.
Although Simon did not discuss Dworkin‘s jurisprudence in any depth,
Simon acknowledged that his argument ―has been inspired by . . . the legal liberalism of
Ronald Dworkin‖ and ―influenced by his phenomenological account of legal
decisionmaking.‖ Id. at 247. Commentators have read Simon‘s jurisprudence as borrowing
heavily from Dworkin‘s arguments. See Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a
Less than Ideal Legal World, 51 STAN. L. REV. 973, 977–78 (1999); Luban, Reason and
Passion, supra note 43, at 886–87. It should be noted that Dworkin himself does not
conflate law with justice. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S EMPIRE 97 (1986) (―Law is also
different from justice. Justice is a matter of the correct or best theory of moral and political
rights, and anyone‘s conception of justice is his theory, imposed by his own personal
convictions, of what these rights actually are.‖).
97.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 38.
98.
Id. at 77; see also William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal
Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991,
996–97 (1999).
99.
See generally DWORKIN, supra note 96.
100.
Simon argued that the traditional partisan approach to lawyering—what he
called the ―dominant view‖ of legal ethics—defines the ―bounds of the law‖ narrowly
according to positivist criteria of whether law has been ―enacted or adopted by recognized
lawmaking institutions of the state‖ and whether it ―take[s] the form of commands or
prohibitions backed by penalties.‖ SIMON, supra note 1, at 27.
101.
See id. at 78.
102.
Id. at 145.

510

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:493

law‖ that constrain their partisan advocacy more expansively. 103 Under Simon‘s
proposed jurisprudence, lawyers may be required to stop short of the arguable
limits of the law by foregoing possible interpretations of law that are inconsistent
with underlying principles of justice.104 Conversely, and more controversially,
lawyers may be required to nullify unjust laws by noncompliance with their formal
terms.105
Although Simon‘s jurisprudence borrows a style of legal interpretation
associated with Dworkian adjudication, it is a jurisprudence designed for lawyers,
not judges. Accordingly, Simon emphasized that in making judgments about the
actions most likely to promote justice, lawyers must take into account a threshold
question of institutional competence, comparing their own capacity to reach
reliable determinations of justice with that of other legal officials. 106 The adversary
system assigns to lawyers a role as client advocates, Simon posited, because judges
and other legal officials are usually better positioned than lawyers to reach reliable
determinations of justice. 107 In situations where the adversary system is
functioning effectively, lawyers can comfortably inhabit their traditional role as
client advocates, deferring to the judgment of other legal officials to declare and
apply the law correctly.108 However, where the institutional competence of existing
procedures is in question—such as where a matter is unlikely to come before an
official decisionmaker; where an adverse party or official decisionmaker ―lacks
information or resources needed to initiate, pursue or determine a claim‖; or where
officials are ―corrupt, or politically intimidated, or incompetent‖—lawyers must
step into the breach and take direct responsibility for substantive justice. 109
Simon‘s jurisprudence represents an advance over both the ethically
problematic legal realist jurisprudence of ordinary practice and the moral activist
alternative. Unlike the radical indeterminacy suggested in the legal realist
conception, Simon‘s jurisprudence requires lawyers to justify deviations from
103.
Id. at 38–39.
104.
Id. at 77.
105.
Id. at 81–82. Simon contended that lawyers owe no particular duty of
obedience to the letter of the law, id. at 103–04, pointing to a long history of explicit and
implicit nullification of positive law in the public interest through judicial interpretation and
regulatory under-enforcement, id. at 86–95. For a criticism of this view, see David B.
Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Should Have a Prima Facie Duty
to Obey the Law, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 269 (1996).
106.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 139–40; see also Simon, supra note 98, at 1004
(clarifying that the analysis of institutional competence is a threshold question).
107.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 139–40. However, even when acting in an advocacy
role, lawyers‘ ultimate loyalty is to justice, not to the advancement of client interests.
Lawyers thus retain a duty to calibrate their actions in ways that facilitate reliable and just
results by refraining from actions like discovery abuse or over-zealous motion practice,
which undermine the smooth operation of the system and diminish the likelihood of reliable
and just results. Id. at 143.
108.
Id. at 138. As Robert Gordon points out, however, most cases will not
deliver this kind of comfort zone because even with the best-matched adversaries, the
adversary system has the capacity to ―horribly malfunction.‖ Robert W. Gordan, The
Radical Conservatism of The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 919, 926 (1999).
109.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 140.
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formal legal requirements with respect to public values that are arguably reflected
in law. Unlike the moral activist alternative, the process Simon prescribes for
searching out legal merit introduces genuinely legal considerations into lawyers‘
reasoning about what justice requires, disciplining lawyers to look beyond their
own moral and political beliefs to ascertain justice in terms of legal norms and
shared interpretive practices of the legal profession. 110
Moreover, Simon‘s jurisprudence ostensibly fulfills the promises that
legal ethics makes to both the public and to clients: that the ―bounds of the law‖
will protect the public interest by limiting over-zealous partisanship, and that the
limits on partisanship will reflect objective and legitimate criteria rather than the
idiosyncratic personal or political views of lawyers. Under Simon‘s view, lawyers
who refuse to advance unjust claims or refrain from over-zealous tactics do not
impose their personal moral views on their clients; they simply judge such claims
and tactics to be legally invalid.111 Because clients are not entitled to pursue legally
invalid claims, lawyers‘ judgments to forego claims or tactics based on
determinations of legal merit remain consistent with rule-of-law values and do not
risk moral overreaching with vulnerable clients. In interactions with more
powerful clients, Simon‘s jurisprudence provides lawyers with the traction that
moral counseling denies them, because lawyers can advise their clients that the
law—interpreted according to its background values and underlying principles—
simply does not permit the lawyers to pursue morally questionable claims or
abusive hyper-zealous tactics.
However, the capacity of Simon‘s jurisprudence to deliver on these
promises rides on the questionable ability of his Dworkian conception of law to
determine true or correct answers to lawyers‘ contextual judgments of legal merit.
As critics have pointed out, if lawyers‘ assessments of ―legal merit‖ turn primarily
on lawyers‘ subjective personal, moral or political beliefs, Simon‘s theory ends
merely restating the moral theorists‘ solution to the problems of legal
professionalism in legal terms.112 In response, Simon appears to adopt a version of
Dworkin‘s ―right answer‖ thesis: that most cases will provide at least a ―best
interpretation‖ if not a ―right answer‖ to the question of how the background
principles and fundamental values in law cohere. 113 Simon concedes—as he
must—that in applying his justice-based theory of legal ethics ―not all lawyers
[will] agree in any given situation on how the applicable principles apply.‖ 114 But
he attributes the variant results to the fact that ―[i]ndividual lawyers will make
mistakes,‖115 suggesting that correct interpretations of what justice requires in
110.
Id. at 102–03. Simon maintained that his theory of legal ethics asks only that
―the lawyer make the best effort she reasonably can to vindicate the relevant legal merit.‖
Simon, supra note 98, at 996.
111.
West, Zealous Advocacy for Justice, supra note 96, at 979–80.
112.
Both moral theorists and jurisprudential positivists in legal ethics have
leveled this critique at Simon‘s theory of legal ethics. Luban, Reason and Passion, supra
note 43, at 885–88; Wendel, supra note 27, at 373–75.
113.
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81,
123–30 (1977).
114.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 51–52.
115.
Id. at 52.
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particular circumstances will emerge from a properly executed analysis of legal
merit.
It has not escaped most observers that the examples Simon provides of
contextual reasoning about legal merit seem heavily tilted toward vindicating a
particular outcome with arguments that can be plausibly framed as legal, rather
than as launching a searching inquiry into the ―best interpretation‖ of the
background values immanent in the law. 116 This point has been illustrated by the
juxtaposition of two of Simon‘s examples. 117 In one, a client on public assistance
lives rent-free in a home owned by her cousin, which requires a reduction of the
client‘s monthly welfare benefits by $150 because the free housing is considered
―income in kind‖ under the applicable regulations. 118 Simon argues that a lawyer
might justifiably recommend to the client that the client make a nominal rent
payment of five dollars per month to her cousin to avoid the force of this
regulation, arguing that it is permissible because ―the claimant‘s interest in a
minimally adequate income is a value of exceptional legal importance‖ reflected in
the law.119 In the second example, a highly paid hotel manager lives on the hotel
premises, and the in-kind benefit of the free housing is taxable as income. 120 Simon
argues that a lawyer could not properly advise the manager to take advantage of a
tax exemption by renegotiating his contract to make living on the hotel premises a
condition of employment. The clear purpose of the exemption, Simon explains, is
to compensate employees who are inconvenienced by the requirement to live
onsite, and it ―would not be consistent with this statutory purpose to apply the
exemption to arrangements the taxpayer has initiated.‖121
It is notable that under the dominant, or implicit operating jurisprudence
of lawyering, either of these maneuvers would be justifiable. As long as the
structuring maneuver is not explicitly prohibited by law, there is no basis in the
operating jurisprudence of lawyers to criticize either as unethical. Ethical analysis
that labels one maneuver ethical and the other unethical might be justified by
moral or distributive justice arguments that view tax breaks for wealthy and
powerful clients differently than legal aid to the poor. This approach is endorsed
under moral theory by Deborah Rhode, who has argued that conventional norms of
zealous advocacy and avoidance of regulation should continue to apply to poverty
lawyers because ―[a]n impoverished mother struggling to escape welfare stands on

116.
Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 43, at 888–91 (discussing the
tenuous legal authority for the lawyer‘s resolution of legal merit in two of Simon‘s
examples). Somewhat surprisingly, Simon‘s response to such criticism is that as long as a
lawyer has produced an analysis that is ―consistent with a minimally plausible interpretation
of [relevant legal] authority,‖ it ought to be counted as a judgment of legal merit rather than
a moral judgment in disguise. Simon, supra note 98, at 999.
117.
See, e.g., William H. Simon et al., William H. Simon: Thinking Like a
Lawyer—About Ethics, 38 DUQUESNE L. REV. 1015, 1035 (2000) (comments by Professor
Bruce S. Ledewitz).
118.
SIMON, supra note 1, at 148.
119.
Id. at 148–49.
120.
Id. at 146.
121.
Id. at 147.
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different ethical footing than a wealthy executive attempting to escape taxes.‖ 122 It
is also endorsed by Susan Carle, who argues for the explicit recognition of the
relative power of the clients in making ethical calls.123 However, Simon does not
argue in favor of such activist interpretations of law on moral or political grounds.
In his view, the ethical difference in the leeway afforded the lawyers to structure
the client‘s affairs to avoid the regulatory effect of the law is driven by
interpretation of the underlying values and principles within the law itself. 124
Without the premise that Dworkian interpretation yields a ―right answer‖
or ―best interpretation‖ of law most of the time, the implications of Simon‘s
jurisprudence are troubling. In determining the ―bounds of the law,‖ Simon‘s
jurisprudence eschews deference to both formal law and client interests in favor of
lawyers‘ assessments of substantive justice in the circumstances that each case
presents. Given the complex, contestable, and multilayered analysis that Simon‘s
approach requires, we might expect that lawyers‘ judgments will be heavily
freighted with the lawyers‘ personal and political beliefs about the moral
worthiness of the client‘s claim and moral justifications for the law.125 If there
really is a right or best interpretation of the ―bounds of the law‖ at which lawyers
are aiming in each case, these judgments may roughly converge. 126 However, if
122.
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 79 (2000).
123.
See generally Susan D. Carle, Power as a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical
Deliberation, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 115 (2006).
124.
See Simon, supra note 98, at 997–99 (defending the legality of the analysis
in his controversial examples by arguing that a purely moral analysis would yield different
results).
125.
As Simon acknowledged, when the definition of law is expanded beyond
positivist criteria to incorporate analysis of the relative weight of various background values
and principles, the question of what law prescribes becomes difficult to answer. SIMON,
supra note 1, at 99–100. And, determining what the law prescribes is only half the game:
lawyers also need to assess the institutional competence of relevant processes and
institutions to arrive at reliable determinations of justice and calibrate their direct
responsibility for ensuring just results accordingly.
126.
Even if the ―right answer‖ thesis holds, Simon‘s theory of legal ethics faces
the critique that the complex contextual judgments it requires are too intellectually
demanding to expect lawyers in ordinary practice to execute reliably. Luban criticized
Simon on this point, arguing that Simon‘s theory of legal ethics requires ―excessive
cognitive demands on lawyers‖ that are ―too strenuous for ordinary decision-making by
ordinary lawyers.‖ Luban, Reason and Passion, supra note 43, at 896. Simon—rightly, in
my view—rejects the charge that his contextual style of reasoning requires an unrealistically
Herculean effort, responding that experienced practitioners already engage in sophisticated
and complex strategic analysis, and that experience renders such judgments less daunting
than they appear when spelled out on paper. Simon, supra note 98, at 995. Interestingly,
Luban raised the same defense to the charge that his own theory of legal ethics, which
requires lawyers to balance the moral justifications for zealous advocacy against the moral
harm caused by adhering to professional role in particular cases, was too complex. See
LUBAN, supra note 19, at 140–41. In my view, Simon and Luban are each correct in noting
that expert judgment looks more complicated when its various steps and multiple factors are
spelled out in writing than it is in actual implementation, where the steps of reasoning and
factors of analysis are incorporated into the schemas on which experts implicitly rely in
processing information.
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there is not, Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering provides substantial leeway for
lawyers to exercise private and unreviewable judgment about the merits of
substantive justice, and to do so under the imprimatur of legal expertise.
To the extent that the law leaves room for genuine disagreement about the
merits of substantive justice—in what I have elsewhere called the ―challenge of
moral pluralism‖127—Simon‘s approach is troubling from the perspective of both
clients and the public. Consider an example I have posed elsewhere, of a lawyer
advising a lesbian couple about how to structure their family affairs to raise a child
together.128 The legal landscape in which the lawyer operates in the ―lesbian family
planning‖ example might well include a narrowly worded statute that explicitly
limits co-adoption to married couples in a state that prohibits same-sex marriage,
making co-adoption technically impossible for same-sex couples.129 However, a
creative interpretation of the statute might permit same-sex adoption based on a
broader provision in the family code stating that family law statutes ought
generally to be construed to protect the ―best interests‖ of children. 130 The problem
with Simon‘s approach in such a legal landscape is that family law is not univocal:
its strands of family privacy, individual autonomy, and parens patriae intervention
on behalf of children are woven together by underlying principles that value both
religious traditionalism and liberal individualism. 131 As a result, a lesbian-friendly
lawyer would be inclined to view the statutory language explicitly confining coadoption to married couples as inappropriately narrow and outmoded and to read
the underlying principles and values in family law as supportive of the rights and
liberties of same-sex couples to establish equal parentage of a child they intend to
raise together.132 A lawyer who believes that homosexuality is immoral and that
raising children in same-sex relationships undermines the important social
institution of the family would interpret the underlying principles and values
inherent in family law differently. Such a lawyer would read the statutory
provisions limiting co-adoption to married heterosexual couples as an expression
of society‘s deeply held faith in the sanctity of marriage and would view attempts
to use a ―best interests of the child‖ provision to extend co-adoption to same-sex
families as manipulative and corruptive of the law‘s underlying values and
principles.133
Under Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering, the couple‘s luck would be in
the draw. The lawyer‘s public responsibility would be to get the interpretation
right, not according to their own conception of right and wrong, but according to a
broadly defined conception of legal merit. Simon‘s jurisprudence would direct
each lawyer to interpret the law in the way that seemed to best fit with law‘s
underlying principles and values, without any particular deference to explicit
127.
See generally Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of
Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REV. 389 (2005).
128.
Id. at 409–11.
129.
Id. at 410–11.
130.
Id. at 430–31.
131.
For an interesting analysis of the underlying principles in family law, see
Vivian E. Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31 (2006).
132.
Kruse, supra note 127, at 431.
133.
Id. at 431–32.
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language in the statute that ran contrary to those purposes and without an anchor in
the client‘s interests. Lawyers with different views of the priority of competing
underlying values might well come to different conclusions about the right or best
interpretation of governing law, and do so in good faith. But, unlike Dworkian
judges, whose decisions about which interpretations best fit and justify the law are
disciplined by exposure to adversary advocacy and public scrutiny, lawyers‘
judgments about the best interpretation of law would be shielded from public
review and cloaked in a mantle of legal expertise that their clients might well lack
the professional education and training to challenge or second-guess.134
The competing jurisprudential camp that has emerged within legal ethics
explicitly takes moral pluralism into account, beginning with the premise that
society is characterized by such a deep and irreconcilable moral pluralism that the
Dworkian ideal of integrating the underlying principles of law into a coherent
narrative is unattainable and Simon‘s jurisprudence of lawyering is unworkable. 135
The next section examines how that premise leads to the positivist school of
thought within the emerging jurisprudence of lawyering.
B. Moral Pluralism and Positivism for Lawyers
Legal scholar Brad Wendel and philosopher Tim Dare have each
advanced a positivist jurisprudence of lawyering derived from a professional duty
to respect the authority of law as a framework for enabling coordinated social
activity in the face of deep and persistent normative disagreement in a morally
pluralistic society.136 According to the premise of moral pluralism that forms the
foundation for the positivist jurisprudence in legal ethics, people in society share
an interest in creating a stable framework to enable cooperative activity despite
their deep and persistent normative disagreement. 137 However, because society is
characterized by a diversity of comprehensive moral viewpoints and empirical
disagreement about how to implement even widely shared norms in concrete
situations,138 society is ―unable to establish a stable basis for cooperative activity
with reference to comprehensive doctrines of the good, or substantive theories of
rights.‖139 According to the positivist theorists in legal ethics, the primary function
of law is to resolve and supersede this normative controversy. 140 Law achieves the
goals of settlement, stability, and coordination by providing neutral lawmaking
procedures that ―transform brute demands into claims of [legal] entitlement.‖ 141 By
accepting the authority of neutral lawmaking procedures, persons who hold
134.
Id. at 426–33. Shaffer and Cochran raise a similar concern, criticizing
Simon‘s theory for putting lawyers in the role of a ―guru.‖ SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note
68, at 40–41.
135.
See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 46–48 (arguing that both Dworkin‘s
jurisprudence and Simon‘s application of it to legal ethics ultimately rely on contested
extra-legal normative criteria rather than interpretation of legal sources).
136.
See generally id.; DARE, supra note 1.
137.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 94; DARE, supra note 1, at 61–63.
138.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 97.
139.
Id. at 98.
140.
Id. at 86–98; DARE, supra note 1, at 59–63.
141.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 114.
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divergent views on justice and morality can coordinate their activities through
mutual respect for law ―without abandoning their own views or embracing the
views of others.‖142
The legal ethicists who accept the premises of moral pluralism argue that
the conception of law that best serves the coordinating function demanded by
moral pluralism is ―broadly positivist‖ in insisting on the separability of legality
from morality.143 Under a moral pluralist view, citizens will never reach full—
maybe not even approximate—agreement on substantive questions of justice.144
Law‘s authority can be established only if it can be derived in a way that retains its
independence from the normative claims it is meant to settle. 145 Positivist
conceptions of law make such settlement possible because they allow citizens to
transcend underlying contests over notions of justice or morality by appealing to
shared understandings of legality. As Tim Dare explains, the authority of law is
analogous to the authority of a coin toss in providing ―a way of going on, of
deciding what to do, despite our disagreement as to what ought to be done.‖146
After the coin toss, the loser has an authoritative reason to set aside substantive
disagreement with the result and accept it as the outcome of a decision procedure
to which the parties agreed.147 Analogously, the fact that something has been
enacted as law is said to provide a sufficient and exclusionary reason for citizens to
obey the authority of law, which supplants any reasoning about contested
underlying policies that led up to the enactment of law. 148
Wendel makes a different argument about the authority of law,
contrasting the coin toss example with his own elaboration of Joseph Raz‘s
example of binding arbitration. 149 Wendel asks us to imagine a dispute between a
manufacturer and distributor of machine parts: the manufacturer believes the
distributor has misappropriated trade secrets and is using those secrets to sell its
own line of products in violation of the parties‘ distribution agreement; the
distributor believes that the technology at issue is not a trade secret, that the side
distribution is not in violation of the parties‘ agreement, and that the manufacturer
is tortiously interfering with his business dealings. 150 After disputing ―the right
way to interpret the contract and the applicable law,‖ the parties are at an impasse,
142.
DARE, supra note 1, at 62.
143.
Id. at 63; WENDEL, supra note 1, at 194–200.
144.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 88.
145.
Id. at 115–16.
146.
DARE, supra note 1, at 62.
147.
Id. at 62–63.
148.
Dare derives this account from Joseph Raz‘s concept of authority, in which
authority requires the provision of exclusionary reasons for action. Id. at 69–71. Dare is
sympathetic as well to Raz‘s derivation of exclusive positivism from this conception of
authority. Id. at 71–73.
149.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 110. The binding arbitration example is offered by
Raz as an example of an authoritative decision that is dependent on the underlying reasons
offered by each party in support of their proposed resolution. JOSPEH RAZ, THE MORALITY
OF FREEDOM 41–42 (1986). The coin toss differs from binding arbitration by producing an
authoritative reason for action that is independent of the underlying reasons.
150.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 110.
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but want to preserve their mutually beneficial commercial relationship, so they
agree to submit their dispute to binding arbitration and to abide by the result. 151
Like the coin toss, the arbitrator‘s decision provides an authoritative reason to set
aside their underlying controversy and continue to do business, even for the losing
party who disagrees with the result of the arbitration. Unlike the coin toss, which is
independent of the underlying issues, the arbitrator‘s decision is based on a
balancing and resolution of the competing reasons in favor of one or the other of
the parties.152
Law, Wendel argues, is more like the decision of the arbitrator than the
coin toss because its settlement is derived from a lawmaking process in which the
parties‘ competing viewpoints have been heard and taken into account. Moreover,
according to Wendel, the legitimacy of law does not rest solely on the fact that law
has achieved an authoritative settlement of normative controversy in society; it
also rests on the fairness of the procedures through which the settlement has been
achieved.153 Normative controversy in society can be settled by installing a
dictator, he points out, but installing a dictator is a normatively unattractive way to
reach a settlement because it does not respect the equality and political liberty of
citizens.154 The normative appeal of democracy is that its lawmaking processes
provide a procedure for resolving normative controversy that ―treat[s] citizens as
equals, entitled to an equal measure of respect no matter what their substantive
views about justice and morality.‖ 155 Lawyers‘ duties of fidelity to law arise out of
respect for the values of equality and dignity reflected in the settlement of
controversy through a democratic lawmaking process that ―give[s] an equal voice
to participants in a political debate, so that the resulting legal settlement reflects
the view[s] of everyone, as much as possible.‖156
When translated into a theory of legal ethics, the positivist jurisprudence
of lawyering has two ramifications for legal advice and counseling. First, lawyers
have a professional duty not to toy with society‘s settlement of normative
controversy by playing interpretive games with the law. Fidelity to law demands
that lawyers interpret the law ―in good faith with due regard to its meaning‖ rather
than ―as an obstacle standing in the way of the client‘s goals.‖ 157 ―The law is
purposive; it is about something,‖ Wendel explains, and good faith interpretation
from an internal point of view ―is aimed at recovering that meaning.‖158 Rather
than zealously pursuing a client‘s interests within any arguable interpretation of
law, Wendel argues that lawyers‘ partisanship should be limited to the pursuit of a
client‘s legal entitlements,159 defined as ―what the law, properly interpreted,
actually provides.‖160 As Tim Dare similarly puts it, partisanship requires only
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 111.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 98.
Wendel, supra note 2, at 1169.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 196.
Id. at 78–79; see also DARE, supra note 1, at 76.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 59.
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―merely-zealous‖ representation that pursues a client‘s legal entitlements, rather
―hyper-zealous‖ representation, in which lawyers ―pursue any advantage attainable
for their client[s] through the law.‖ 161
Second, respect for the authority of law commits lawyers to pursuing their
clients‘ legal entitlements regardless of their own moral agreement or
disagreement with their clients‘ aims. For law to settle normative controversy,
moral considerations must be separated from the determination of law and external
to the professional role of lawyers. 162 Lawyers who re-introduce moral
considerations into their interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ actively
―undercut the procedures which allow the advocates of a plurality of views to live
together in communities.‖163 Moreover, to the extent that law incorporates moral
standards, lawyers should look not to their own resolution of the incorporated
moral standards, but to the beliefs of the legal officials who are likely to apply the
law.164
As with Simon‘s Dworkian jurisprudence of lawyering, the capacity of
the positivist theories of lawyering to deliver on the promises legal ethics makes to
clients and to the public rides in part on its capacity to deliver clear and
determinative answers to interpretive questions. There are significant differences
between the nature of a coin toss or binding arbitration in settling a private dispute
and the nature of law in settling normative controversy in a morally pluralistic
society. In the consensual coin toss and binding arbitration examples from which
Wendel and Dare generalize respect for the authority of law, the parties have
endorsed the decision procedure in advance and agreed to submit their dispute to
that procedure for resolution. Moreover, these procedures produce a clear result—a
coin toss comes up either heads or tails—without further dispute about what the
result means. Law‘s capacity to deliver such clear results is debatable. Even in
Wendel‘s binding arbitration example, which does not implicate a particularly
deep normative controversy in society, the law is open to multiple interpretations,
and it is the arbitrator who provides the authoritative interpretation that allows the
parties to move forward.
Wendel recognizes that law‘s indeterminacy poses a challenge to the
premise that law can successfully settle normative controversy in a morally
pluralistic society.165 He concedes that it is most often not possible to ―read the
161.
DARE, supra note 1, at 76.
162.
The exclusion of ordinary moral reasoning from the performance of
professional role is dictated in part by the argument that lawyers occupy a role, and that the
occupant of any role is subject to the distinct obligations and permissions incident to the
role, excluding recourse to considerations that might otherwise influence decisionmaking.
Id. at 44–47. In the case of lawyers in a morally pluralistic society, the prohibition on the
recourse to ordinary moral considerations is bolstered by the function of law as the
settlement of normative controversy in society.
163.
Id. at 77.
164.
Wendel, supra note 7, at 108.
165.
See, e.g., Wendel, supra note 27, at 395 (conceding that his conception of
legal ethics ―does real work in ruling out particular actions taken by lawyers, even if it
underdetermines action in cases with multiple plausible interpretations of the governing
legal norms‖).
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meaning of the law directly from legal texts‖ and that the client‘s legal
entitlements are therefore not always clear.166 However, Wendel insists that
interpreting the law respectfully with due regard for its intended meaning is not a
wholly subjective enterprise; it is an exercise of professional judgment susceptible
to criticism based on ―intersubjective criteria‖ of validity. 167 These criteria are built
on social practices that differentiate legal from non-legal reasons and plausible
from implausible interpretations of law.168 Interpretations of the ―bounds of the
law‖ that would not pass muster within interpretive communities ―comprised of
judges, lawyers, scholars, and interested citizens who have learned to differentiate
between legal and non-legal reasons‖169 cannot be said to constitute ―legal‖ advice
because they violate the implicit ―rules of recognition‖ that arise from the social
practices of lawyers.170
According to Wendel, the positivist jurisprudence of lawyering rules out
some of the most extreme interpretations of law deployed by Enron lawyers in
structuring their client‘s financial transactions and by Office of Legal Counsel
lawyers advising the Bush administration on the laws prohibiting torture of enemy
combatants in United States custody. 171 However, the moderate indeterminacy that
fidelity to law leaves behind still allows lawyers to choose from the range of
multiple plausible interpretations that remain. 172 Within this range of plausible
interpretations, the positivist jurisprudential theories look to the underlying
function of law in settling normative controversy in society to guide lawyers‘
interpretive practices. Lawyers, Wendel argues, should ―understand their role in
the process of legal interpretation as coordination-enhancing.‖173
While recognizing that fidelity to law is ―a complex political value,
including ideals of both stability and flexibility,‖ 174 Wendel consistently leans in
the direction of upholding the stabilizing function of law. Wendel firmly insists
that lawyers owe fidelity to laws despite lawmaking processes admittedly skewed
by existing disparities in power, wealth, and social influence that fall far short of
the ideal of equal participation.175 He explicitly rules out lawyers‘ covert
166.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 176–77.
167.
Id. at 196.
168.
Id. at 185.
169.
Id. at 196, 207.
170.
Id. at 196–97.
171.
Wendel discusses these examples in Wendel, supra note 2, at 1218–32.
172.
Even among interpretive communities, there is a continuum of assessments
of relative plausibility ranging from solid to frivolous along which legal interpretations
might fall. WENDEL, supra note 1, at 185. Wendel‘s aim is merely to show that some
interpretations are out of bounds: ―that there is enough objectivity and determinacy in the
law that the set of inadequately supported legal positions is not empty.‖ Id. at 176.
173.
Wendel, supra note 27, at 393.
174.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 131.
175.
Wendel describes the actual lawmaking process as follows, arguing that it is
entitled to respect and fidelity despite its shortcomings:
[E]lectoral politics is skewed by the influence of wealthy donors, both
corporate and individual, and policy-making is affected by interest-group
lobbying; the ability of many citizens to participate in the political
process is limited by disparities in wealth and the inability to organize
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nullification or subversion of laws they deem unjust or outmoded through
strategies like selective ignorance of damaging facts or the creative structuring of
client affairs, reflected in the welfare avoidance examples endorsed (for different
reasons) by Simon and Rhode.176 Although there may be a theoretical basis for
avoiding the effect of laws enacted by unfair processes, Wendel argues that it is
necessary to ―set the threshold very high for a finding of unfairness‖ because
citizens in a morally pluralistic society are likely to have competing notions of
fairness, and to base the professional duty of fidelity to law on a thick notion of
procedural fairness in lawmaking would re-mire society in the very type of
normative controversy from which law is supposed to extract it. 177 It was
justifications of exactly this type, he cautions, that fueled the Enron lawyers,
whose clients ―believed, in sincere subjective good faith, that their company‘s
business model was so game-changing that it had simply outpaced legal regulation,
and that fidelity to anachronistic laws would only hamper necessary innovation in
dynamic markets.‖178
The view of moral conflict in the positivist jurisprudential theories of
lawyering—that moral conflict is a problem that law needs to overcome through
settlement—may be criticized for undervaluing the need for flexibility and
openness in a morally pluralistic society. Isaiah Berlin, one of the most prominent
political philosophers to endorse a premise of moral pluralism, wrote quite
differently about the ideal to which morally pluralistic societies should aspire: that
it should be the aim of decent societies ―to promot[e] and preserv[e] an uneasy
equilibrium which is constantly threatened and in constant need of repair.‖179 In
the face of moral pluralism, one might hope for a society that takes this vision
more seriously by alternatively aiming to unsettle majoritarian control as well as to
stabilize it. The emphasis that the positivist jurisprudence of lawyering places on
stability and coordination leaves little space for clients to create Berlin‘s ―uneasy
equilibrium‖ by structuring their private affairs in ways that resist or avoid unfair
laws and by unsettling the authority of law by creating a web of social practices
that are increasingly distant from formal legal requirements.

into effective coalitions; differentials in wealth and power are reinforced
by structural features such as inequality in primary and secondary
education and the practical inaccessibility to middle-income families of
elite higher-education institutions; women, people of color, sexual
minorities, and people with disabilities face persistent discrimination,
both explicit and tacit, which reinforces inequality in the political,
economic, and social realms; and for the poorest and most disempowered
citizens, the state is not perceived as a means of engagement at all, but as
an alien force they experience, if at all, through intrusive policing and
bureaucratic indifference.
Id. at 91.
176.
Id. at 134. For discussion of the welfare avoidance examples, see supra notes
118–24 and accompanying text.
177.
WENDEL, supra note 1, at 102.
178.
Id. at 134–35.
179.
ISAIAH BERLIN, The Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED TIMBER OF
HUMANITY 1, 19 (1990).
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The commitment to the overriding importance of law‘s stability and
settlement function leads Wendel to the conclusion that ―moderately fair‖ legal
systems must in the end simply tolerate the ―localized injustice‖ suffered by
discrete groups, such as sexual minority groups who ―believe that the political
process has been captured by citizens whose irrational bigotry renders them unable
to decide fairly on matters of concern to these groups, such as same-sex marriage
and same-sex-partner adoption rights.‖180 If a law is unjust, he argues, lawyers
must either support it or seek to challenge it directly through public modes of law
reform, lest they damage or undermine the very framework of law that makes legal
strategies of reform possible through disrespectful non-compliance.181 Wendel
admits with an air of resignation that the low threshold he sets for fidelity to law
enacted with ―rough equality and tolerably fair procedures‖ 182 provides ―a thin
basis for solidarity, but it is likely the best we can do.‖183 The need to settle
controversy is pressing, the resources for reaching a settlement are limited, and
―[a]t some point the majority is entitled to say, ‗we have heard enough,‘ and move
on.‖184

III. SHIFTING THE PARADIGM:
TOWARD A CLIENT-CENTERED JURISPRUDENCE OF LAWYERING
The emerging jurisprudence of lawyering proposes new and refreshing
answers to the ethical problems created when lawyers pursue their clients‘
objectives within the bounds of the law, while at the same time interpreting the
bounds of the law instrumentally as a cost or interference to be avoided or
structured around. As Part I explained, the implicit operating jurisprudence
criticized in legal ethics is based on legal realist conceptions of law, which ignore
constraints that might arise from law‘s underlying purpose and strip law of its
normative content. The moral theories in legal ethics took this instrumental
interpretive stance as a set feature of legal representation and sought to mitigate its
deleterious effects by incorporating ordinary moral responsibilities into lawyers‘
professional duties—responsibilities that encouraged lawyers to engage in
instructional moral counseling designed to bring the pursuit of their clients‘ private
goals into line with the public good. However, the moral theory approach threatens
to undermine rule-of-law values, strains against the role that lawyers play as client
agents and fiduciaries, and is questionable in terms of its public benefit, both
because lawyers have no special expertise in moral reasoning vis-à-vis their clients
and because the structural constraints of practice are likely to make such moral
advice ineffectual in the situations where it is most needed.
As Part II demonstrated, the jurisprudential theories in legal ethics take an
alternative route of defining the task of lawyers‘ interpretations of the ―bounds of
the law‖ to encompass public duties of correct or good faith interpretation of
law.185 As Part II argued, the conceptions of law that set the standard for correct or
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

WENDEL, supra note 1, at 102–03.
Id. at 129–32.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 101.
As Ben Zipursky points out, counseling a client about what the law says has
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good faith interpretation depend for their legitimacy on the fulfillment of certain
conditions, and it is questionable whether law has the capacity to deliver what
these jurisprudential theories demand. For example, the Dworkian model of
adjudication built into Simon‘s contextual theory of legal ethics conceives of law
according to its correspondence with principles of substantive justice that can be
derived from the underlying values and principles in the law. Its success depends
on the capacity of law to deliver right answers to these questions of fit and
justification. The positivist jurisprudence on which Wendel and Dare stake their
theories of legal ethics depend on the capacity of law to transcend normative
controversy in society through shared understandings of legality.
In this Part, I question the underlying framework within which the
emerging jurisprudential theories in legal ethics are based, using Ted Schneyer‘s
work in legal ethics as a guide. I argue that, even if law has the capacities these
jurisprudential theories claim—to correspond with substantive justice or to settle
normative controversy in society—their jurisprudential successes cannot be
achieved by delegating authoritative interpretation of law to lawyers. Yet, this is
exactly what the emerging theories in the jurisprudence of lawyering do. Both
Simon‘s Dworkian jurisprudence and the positivist jurisprudence define lawyers‘
primary duties in terms of public goods: substantive justice or legal entitlement. In
the emerging theories, the lawyers owe primary fidelity to the law and only
secondary duties to their clients. In the emerging jurisprudence of legal ethics,
lawyers stand between the law and their clients and have direct responsibility for
achieving law‘s aims through the interpretations of the ―bounds of the law‖ that
they provide to their clients, case-by-case and controversy-by-controversy.
Ted Schneyer has long noted the perils and problems of assigning
primary responsibility to lawyers for carrying out public duties, and his work
provides a template of considerations that those embarking on a jurisprudence of
lawyering ought to take into account. 186 Schneyer‘s arguments in favor of the
primacy of client-centered duties in legal ethics are based in important part on the
capacity of client-centered legal ethics to hold lawyers accountable to something
beyond their own interests.187 One of Schneyer‘s early and groundbreaking
critiques of theoretical legal ethics was that the solutions proposed by moral
theorists were aimed at the wrong target: he argued that much of the apparently
excessively client-regarding behavior at the center of concern about legal
professionalism could be more easily explained in terms of the coincidence of
zealous advocacy with lawyers‘ pursuit of their own financial, reputational, and
professional interests.188 The problem with holding lawyers primarily accountable
to public values, Schneyer argues, is that the lack of widespread public consensus
on what counts as morally right or substantively just makes adherence to those

a normative component built into it through the concept of legal obligation that inheres in
legal rules. Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Obligation and the Internal Aspect of Rules, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1229, 1249 (2006).
186.
See generally Schneyer, supra note 10; Schneyer, Perils of Public Values,
supra note 17.
187.
Schneyer, Perils of Public Values, supra note 17, at 1841–42.
188.
Schneyer, supra note 11, at 1544–50.
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norms difficult to enforce. 189 A client-centered role morality protects clients
against lawyer self-dealing and ―guards against the risk that [lawyers], biased by
strong financial pressures or personal bonds and unconstrained by role, would
misapply their own conceptions of justice or all-things-considered morality.‖190
To be fair, Schneyer directs his criticisms of professionalizing public
duties against the moral theorists in legal ethics, noting that jurisprudential theory
at least ―tries to grapple with the complexities‖ of defining justice with reference
to a jurisprudentially grounded conception of law. 191 However, Schneyer‘s oftrepeated cautions about lawyer accountability and the risks of lawyer self-dealing
ought to concern us in the emerging jurisprudence of lawyering as well. Because
the interpretation of the ―bounds of the law‖ is a task grounded in lawyers‘
expertise rather than their personal moral judgments, it has the benefit of
disciplining lawyers to look beyond their personal or political views in deciding
the limits of their representation. Yet in carrying out the interpretive task, lawyers
must exercise judgment about how to implement the public duties that the
jurisprudence of lawyering assigns directly to them. To the extent that the law is
indeterminate, lawyers‘ judgments about its underlying purpose pose some of the
same risks that the moral theories in legal ethics face: that lawyers will
inappropriately impose their own views on their clients rather than acting as their
clients‘ agents; and that their private and unreviewable interpretations of the
―bounds of the law‖ in their clients‘ cases will undermine rule-of-law values.
Additionally, the dangers of lawyer overreaching within the lawyer–client
relationship are greater when the lawyer communicates a limitation on legal
representation in terms of the ―bounds of the law‖ than they are when the lawyer
offers a moral opinion or advice that a client feels more free to accept or reject on
the basis of the client‘s own moral agreement or disagreement with the lawyer‘s
view.
Schneyer‘s concern about the risks of lawyer overreaching and selfdealing has always been tempered by an optimistic realism about the potential for
lawyers to engage in professional self-correction through appropriately structured
self-regulation. In a field where cynicism about the decline of the legal profession
is rife, Ted Schneyer has always had faith: in lawyers, in traditional client-centered
lawyering, and in the legal profession. His archival study of the bar politics in the
creation of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct rejected simplistic
accounts of lawyer self-regulation either as ―a collective effort to aggrandize
lawyers at their clients‘ expense,‖ 192 or as ―a public relations charade that would
legitimate the bar‘s tradition of self-regulation but have no regulatory bite.‖193
Rather, he revealed the interplay of complex and shifting alliances among different
sectors of the bar and a sensitivity to both public and academic criticism of the
legal profession. Schneyer‘s groundbreaking work on law firm discipline similarly
emphasizes both optimism about the potential for law firms to develop
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infrastructures to support and patrol the ethical quality of their legal representation,
and the need for bar agencies to hold firms ethically accountable for doing so. 194
My own work in legal ethics both mirrors and elaborates these themes in
Schneyer‘s work. Like Schneyer, I am skeptical about the standard legal ethics
diagnosis of the problem of professionalism as stemming from lawyers‘ strict
adherence to partisan professional norms.195 Although lawyers sometimes invoke
zealous partisanship as an excuse to justify tactics that coincide with their own
financial or reputational interests, I share Schneyer‘s faith that client-centered
professional norms need not demand such tactics, and attempts to curb excessive
zeal need not do away with the primary commitment of lawyers to their clients. As
Schneyer has written, ―Nothing about a properly reconstructed hired-gun ethic
stands in the way of a lawyer‘s (1) considering solutions that can accommodate the
interests of adversaries, (2) proposing such solutions to clients, and (3) helping
clients see that those solutions are also in their own interests.‖ 196 And, he argued,
―[i]f lawyers can be trained to understand this, then how much about hired-gun
ethics is there left to fear?‖197
The engaged client-centered theory of the lawyer–client relationship that I
am developing has focused so far on defining the duty of partisanship to include a
responsibility to shape legal representation around a more robust understanding of
client objectives grounded in the client‘s values as well as their legal interests. 198 It
can be seen as an alternative response to one of the more troubling problems
associated with the legal realist conception of law: the prospect that lawyers‘
preoccupation with their clients‘ legal rights and interests distorts their
perspectives on their clients‘ objectives. 199 I have argued that when clients seek
legal representation, their legal interests are most often entangled with other
projects, commitments, and relationships with others, all of which are natural
sources of normative constraint on a client‘s objectives. 200 Lawyers provide expert
legal advice by sorting the facts of the client‘s situation into a series of legal
categories: claims, defenses, procedures, evidence. As their clients‘ legal rights
and interests come more sharply into focus, other non-legal concerns—clients‘
relationships with others, reputation and standing in the community, values and
commitments that clients want to honor—can fade into the background. As a
result, lawyers may come to over-value the client‘s legal rights and interests
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See generally Schneyer, Discipline for Law Firms, supra note 15; Schneyer,
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Id. at 27.
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Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 431–
37 (2006) [hereinafter Kruse, Fortess in the Sand].
199.
I have elsewhere called this the problem of ―legal objectification.‖ Kruse,
supra note 35, at 104. The professional tendency of lawyers to reduce their clients to the
sum of the clients‘ legal interests was identified and understood in early legal ethics as a
moral problem. Wasserstrom, supra note 37, at 21; Simon, supra note 8, at 54. See also
generally Lehman, supra note 37.
200.
Kruse, supra note 35, at 132.
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relative to the weight that the client might assign to the protection of those rights
and interests when the client compares them to the other things that the client
values. The solution to this problem is not to turn over moral control of the
representation to the lawyer; it is to get lawyers to bring their clients‘ other
interests and concerns back into the picture so that legal representation can be
directed toward objectives that put the pursuit of legal interests into the context of
the other values, relationships, and concerns that are important to clients.
This kind of solution was a central focus of client-centered theories of
lawyering that grew out of clinical legal scholarship in the 1970s and 1980s. 201
Client-centered representation responded to the problem of legal objectification
through a combination of strategies designed to increase lawyers‘ attention to the
interrelationship between a client‘s legal and non-legal concerns and to reconfigure authority and expertise in the lawyer–client relationship in ways that
recognized a broader and more participatory role for clients in legal
representation.202 The foundation for client-centered representation is a
conceptualization of legal representation as problem-solving that puts the client—
rather than the client‘s legal issues—at the center of legal representation. 203 When
legal representation is conceptualized as problem-solving, the non-legal aspects of
a client‘s problem or situation—the economic, social, psychological, political,
moral, and religious considerations—play a more prominent role. Because the
client has better access to information about the relative weight and importance of
these considerations, as well as a better sense of how choosing different legal
alternatives will affect these non-legal values, the client is seen as better situated
than the lawyer to make many of the decisions related to representation. 204
Client-centered representation initially relied heavily on the idea that
lawyers and clients occupy separate spheres of expertise and the client-centered
approach articulated methods of interviewing and counseling based largely on
lawyer neutrality and non-interference into client decisionmaking.205 However,
client-centered representation has matured well beyond that conception.
Sophisticated conceptions of client-centered representation now include ideals of
holistic representation, cross-cultural competence, problem-solving lawyering,
lawyering as empowerment, and lawyering for social change, which blur the
boundaries between lawyer and client expertise about law and legal strategies and
promote more collaborative and interdisciplinary methods of lawyering. 206 In these

201.
For a comprehensive examination of the history and theoretical basis for this
approach, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and
Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501 (1990). For a survey of the growth and development of
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generally Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 198.
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See id. at 376–77.
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See id. at 378.
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Id. at 379–80.
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Id. at 387–99. I have argued that these expansions of client-centered
lawyering theory have created a plurality of client-centered values that may be in tension
with one another: holistic representation, narrative integrity, client empowerment, partisan
advocacy, and client-directed lawyering. Id. at 419–26.
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―engaged client-centered‖ practices, lawyers become more actively involved in
helping clients articulate their objectives, offer advice based on the lawyers‘ best
understanding of the clients‘ values, and involve clients in decisions and strategies
that might traditionally be thought to fall within lawyers‘ expertise and
decisionmaking authority with legal representation. 207
Client-centered representation is theoretically grounded in respect for
client autonomy.208 Autonomy tends to get a bad name in legal ethics because it is
equated with permitting clients to do whatever they want to do without either
guidance or self-restraint.209 Generally, the foundation offered for a clientautonomy-based theory of legal ethics is a libertarian argument that citizens are
entitled to be free from state interference with minimal deference to society‘s need
to accomplish basic coordinating goals, sometimes supplemented with
consequentialist arguments that providing individuals with maximum freedom
achieves justice.210 The repudiation of these arguments has been powerfully stated
by the leading thinkers within legal ethics. David Luban has systematically
critiqued arguments that the lawyers‘ partisan role in an adversary system is the
best way to determine truth, to protect legal rights, or to reflect society‘s
commitment to enhancing personal autonomy and protecting human dignity. 211
Lawyers, he asserted, invoke such arguments as an ―adversary system excuse‖ to
justify instrumental manipulation of the law and legal process to maximize their
clients‘ legal interests. William Simon similarly critiqued the ―ideology of
advocacy‖ as an incoherent and internally inconsistent theoretical basis for the
neutral partisan advocacy deemed necessary to the functioning of the legal
system.212
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However, these critiques of client autonomy rely—either explicitly or
implicitly—on the image of clients as Holmesian ―bad men‖ bent on maximizing
their freedom from state interference, and a view of autonomy that emphasizes the
concept of ―negative liberty,‖ or the freedom to be left alone. 213 They tend to
overlook conceptions of autonomy grounded in the ―positive liberty‖ to live one‘s
life according to values that one has chosen and affirmed over time. 214 When we
shift our view of autonomy to encompass conceptions of ―positive liberty,‖ a
different picture of the connections between enhancing autonomy and achieving
justice emerges. Positive liberty is based in notions of self-actualization, or as
Joseph Raz has put it, the ability to be the author of one‘s own life. 215 The
conditions of an autonomous life under this view are not reducible to separation
from others and independence from external constraint, but are based in creative
and constructive engagement in projects, commitments, relationships, and
endeavors.216 The richer conception of positive freedom helps to justify and inform
practices of engaged client-centered lawyering within the basic framework of
enhancing and supporting client autonomy. 217
However, appeals to client autonomy alone cannot support a full-blown
theory of legal ethics, because theories of legal ethics require a balancing of duties
that lawyers owe to clients and to the public. Theories of client autonomy can do
much to elucidate client-centered theories of how engaged lawyers should be in
helping clients clarify and define their objectives without making Holmesian ―bad
man‖ assumptions that clients are primarily self-interested. They can even
encompass the notion that enhancing a client‘s autonomy may include helping
clients who value obedience to law to meet that objective. But a full-blown theory
of lawyering would require more. It would require an account of the relationship
between enhancing client autonomy and the function of law in society, and a
jurisprudence of lawyering that explains how in enhancing their clients‘ autonomy,
lawyers contribute to the functioning of law.
It is possible to sketch out a different understanding of the traditional
client-centered role of lawyers within the legal system based on this conception of
autonomy as positive—or self-creative—liberty. In such a view, the function of
law in promoting autonomy is not based merely on leaving citizens alone but on
creating conditions in which they can actualize their values by supporting their
creative endeavors and helping them structure their commitments within
productive relationships and supportive communities. The qualities of law that
213.
This reliance is explicit Simon‘s critique of what he calls ―positivist
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RAZ, supra note 149, at 370; see also ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of
Liberty, in LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). David Luban has defended such a
conception, relying on the concept of dignity rather than the concept of autonomy. See
DAVID LUBAN, Lawyers as Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren’t Busy
Assaulting It), in HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 1, at 65, 70–72, 76.
215.
RAZ, supra note 149, at 369–71.
216.
Id. at 373–81.
217.
Kruse, Fortress in the Sand, supra note 198, at 413–26.

528

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 53:493

create these conditions are not limited to maintaining social stability but include
flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of citizens to access legal structures for
a variety of diverse projects and in the context of multiple and shifting subcommunities and counter-cultures in which these diverse projects are rooted and
sustained. Lawyers‘ partisan duties to clients and their duties to the legal system
can be harmonized within this vision through the idea that lawyers‘ partisan
representation of clients helps create space within and around the law for clients to
experiment with and test the legitimacy of the norms enacted into law, so that
individuals can both pursue the projects that will enable them to lead autonomous
lives, and so that law can adjust itself to the needs of its citizenry. Rather than
seeing partisan representation as the cynical manipulation of law to maximize
clients‘ interests, it could be viewed as a creative attempt to legitimate the client‘s
values by connecting them to values reflected in the law; or to challenge the law
by surfacing divergence between the clients‘ values and values reflected in law.
Existing strands of thought within legal ethics, social science, and
political theory support this vision of the lawyers‘ role. Within legal ethics, Daniel
Markovits has argued that lawyers play ―critical roles in sustaining the legitimacy‖
of legal frameworks in the litigation context by ―bringing the law‘s doctrinal
categories and the concerns of clients into equilibrium.‖ 218 Markovits draws in part
on a vast body of ―law and society‖ literature to argue that when lawyers engage
clients about how their projects, aims, and values fit within the law, it transforms
the way clients view their demands by restating them as legal claims that stand in
relationship to the claims and interests of others in society. 219 Such empirical
analysis reveals the complex ways in which law both influences, and is influenced
by, social norms.220 These interactions can be seen as a sort of proving ground in
which the legitimacy of law is tested through acts of compliance, resistance, and
creative reinterpretation that extend well beyond the formal structures of
adjudicative and administrative interpretation. Moreover, as noted above, there is
support in political theory for the view that morally pluralistic democratic societies
ought to allow citizens informal spaces within which to contest and unsettle the
law, as well as to use law to coordinate social activity in the face of normative
controversy.221
The jurisprudential role to which lawyers would be assigned in this vision
is a familiar one: client-centered agents charged with using their legal expertise to
help their clients make informed decisions about law compliance and law
avoidance. Lawyers‘ judgments about how to characterize the law to their clients
would be informed by their role in facilitating interaction between the norms
218.
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inherent in the law and their clients‘ values, rather than providing bare legal
conclusions that give clients a ―bottom line‖ assessment of what the law permits or
prohibits in the clients‘ circumstances. This facilitative role does not assume that
enforcement is clients‘ only concern; it favors providing clients with information
about law‘s purposes as a way to invite clients to accept (or reject) law as a
normative guide to their behavior. Lawyers in a facilitative role would educate
their clients by communicating the law in the context of a sympathetic version of
the purposes that law is meant to fulfill. Such ―full picture‖ counseling about the
law positions clients to make informed decisions about compliance with—or
avoidance of—law‘s dictates based on clients‘ assessments of whether the law,
understood within the context of its regulatory purposes, is worthy of their
respect.222
I have recently explored such an approach as a critical issue in legal
interviewing and counseling by analyzing the ethical and jurisprudential issues that
arise in lawyer–client dialogue between a prison inmate client with a child support
debt and his legal services lawyer.223 In this fictitious interview, the client begins
by raising a concern about notices he is receiving in prison from the child support
enforcement office, which show his child support debt continuing to rise despite
his inability to earn money in prison.224 The lawyer explains the basic doctrines of
child support law to him, offering a ―decidedly sympathetic‖ account of the
purposes behind child support law, which help the client connect the purposes
inherent in the law to his own values and desire to support his daughter. 225 The
lawyer‘s explanation of the purposes behind the rule that imputes income to child
support obligors based on their earning potential despite their actual earnings
surfaces a divergence between the client‘s situation and the situation that the
imputed income standard is meant to address. 226 The lawyer explores this gap by
reference to a paradigmatic example of a hypothetical highly paid doctor who
voluntarily foregoes his income to follow his dream of being a street artist,
contrasting the hypothetical doctor with the client who lacks the ability to respond
to the incentive created by the law by getting a job that would actualize his earning
potential.227 I used this example to illustrate that when lawyers explain the reasons
―that best justify the law governing their clients‘ situations‖—exemplified in this
case by the reasons why the law would imputed income to the hypothetical
doctor—they ―invite their clients to assess the validity of those reasons‖ and to
either ―see the law as a reasonable constraint on their behavior‖ or ―decide that the
law deserves little respect other than the fear of its enforcement.‖ 228
An anecdote from my own experience on the client side of the lawyer–
client relationship also illustrates how such an approach might work in practice. In
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1993, my sister Ann was hit by a car while crossing the street on an icy January
night. The accident broke both of her legs below the knee, and while one leg
sustained a clean break, the other required multiple surgeries and a lengthy stay in
a nursing home. Ann is a developmentally disabled adult living independently and
at the time of the accident was no longer covered by health insurance that had until
recently been provided through a job. The driver of the car was an employee at a
Perkins restaurant, who had been sent on an errand to the local supermarket when
the restaurant‘s supply of pickles ran out. The lawyer who agreed to pursue a
personal injury case on Ann‘s behalf was a small town Wisconsin lawyer in the
very best sense you might imagine: smart, creative, caring, and holistic in his
approach.
Because Ann‘s injuries rendered her incapable of heavy physical labor
and her cognitive disability limited her ability to do clerical and other light work,
her lawyer suggested that she apply for social security disability benefits that
would cover her medical and rehabilitative expenses from the date of application
forward. Ann had a modest but significant amount of money—about $30,000—
that she had inherited from our great-uncle several years ago. Her lawyer advised
us about how we might protect those assets from being reached and spent down
before the benefits began to cover her hospital and nursing home expenses. He
informed us that a ―loophole‖ in the law regarding transfers of assets would fail to
re-capture funds that were deposited by Ann into a joint bank account and then
withdrawn by a joint account holder. He told us that such transfers went against
the spirit of the law, which was designed to prohibit divestment of assets prior to
applying for government benefits, and that legislation had already been passed that
would close the loophole. However, he told us that the legislation would not go
into effect for several more months and that making the transfer now would not be
technically illegal.
Of course, this is exactly the kind of information and advice about the
law—that the law technically allows behavior that contravenes a clear regulatory
purpose recently reaffirmed by legislation designed to close an existing loophole—
that is at issue in the jurisprudential theories of lawyering. The result of analysis
under the emerging jurisprudential theories has to be that Ann‘s lawyer had no
business sharing information about how to take eleventh-hour advantage of a
closing loophole with his clients. Personally, I am grateful that the lawyer was
unaware of any such jurisprudential duties.
What is most striking to me about this example from my own experience,
however, is not the fact that the lawyer felt free to give us the advice, but the way
he delivered it and the effect that his delivery had on our family‘s decisionmaking.
Unlike a lawyer operating under Holmesian bad man assumptions about our
interests and his role, the lawyer‘s advice did not come across as a professional
assessment that we needed to protect the money by setting up a joint account and
making the transfer.229 Nor did he engage in even mild forms of judgmental
229.
Although perhaps only subtly different, advice that begins and ends with the
assumption that a client will want to take advantage of every loophole may be heard by the
client to be the lawyer‘s professional assessment that the best course of action for the client
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moralizing suggested by some legal ethicists about whether taking advantage of
the loophole would be the ―right thing‖ or a ―fair thing‖ to do. 230 Instead, he gave
us the information that he as a legal expert possessed and that we as laypersons
lacked: that the loophole existed, that it was technically legal to make a transfer,
and that its availability ran counter to the intended purpose of the law. This
information enabled us to make a decision that took into account our own values
associated with law compliance and advantage-taking, that considered how
seriously the specific transfer in this case contravened the purposes of the law, and
that evaluated how strongly those considerations weighed against our desire to
protect (albeit symbolically through protection of assets) our particularly
vulnerable family member. Without specifically engaging us in a moral dialogue,
the way the lawyer characterized the law sparked a decisionmaking process that
took morality into account.

CONCLUSION
Theorizing a workable jurisprudence of lawyering is a project that is just
beginning to bloom in legal ethics. Springtime is a time of hope, expectation, and
promise. This brief sketch of the contours of a client-centered jurisprudence of
lawyering is still quite far from a fully developed theory of legal ethics. It remains
to be seen whether a workable jurisprudence of lawyering can fulfill the Noble
Dream of lawyers acting as intermediaries between clients and the law. Its further
development will require careful attention to the considerations Ted Schneyer has
provided over the years: theoretical models in legal ethics must fit plausibly within
the profession‘s self-understanding; they must be responsive to the concern for
lawyer self-dealing without devolving into cynicism about the potential for lawyer
self-regulation; and they must remain attentive to the need for workable structures
of accountability and enforcement.
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